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A. Introduction 
In 2008, John Ruggie, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, proposed a 
‘conceptual and policy framework’ to address the relationship between business and 
human rights.
1
 The Framework articulated businesses’ responsibility to respect human 
rights, which was said to be grounded in widely shared social expectations of appropriate 
business conduct.
2
 The 2011 United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights (the Guiding Principles),
3
 were an attempt ‘to provide concrete and practical 
recommendations for … implementation [of the Framework]’.
4
 The Guiding Principles were 
endorsed by the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council,
5
 and have since been 
incorporated in a range of international regulatory instruments addressing corporate 
responsibility for human rights violations.
6
 
Due diligence is at the heart of the Guiding Principles. As Ruggie explained: 
                                                          
1
 Report to the UN Human Rights Council 'Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human 
Rights’ (7 April 2008), UN Doc A/HRC/8/5, available at http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Ruggie-report-7-
Apr-2008.pdf (hereinafter ‘Framework Report’).  
2
 Ibid, at para 54. On the logic of appropriateness, as opposed to the logic of consequences, see John Ruggie, 
Just Business: Multinational Corporations and Human Rights (Norton, 2013) p. 106. 
3
 Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and 
Remedy” Framework', UN Doc HR/PUB/11/04, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf.  
4
 Report to the UN Human Rights Council ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the 
United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework‘ (21 March 2011), UN Doc A/HRC/17/31, at para 9. 
5
 UN Human Rights Council Resolution 17/4 (16 June 2011), UN Doc A/HRC/RES/17/4. 
6
 The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (http://oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/48004323.pdf), the 
International Finance Corporation’s Sustainability Performance Standards 
(http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/7540778049a792dcb87efaa8c6a8312a/SP_English_2012.pdf?MOD=AJ
PERES) and the Equator Principles (on project finance requirements - http://www.equator-
principles.com/index.php/ep3), all now incorporate human rights due diligence requirements based on the 
Guiding Principles. 
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To discharge the [corporate] responsibility to respect [human rights] requires 
due diligence. This concept describes the steps a company must take to become 
aware of, prevent and address adverse human rights impacts.
7
  
Five of the 31 Guiding Principles appear under the heading ‘Human Rights Due Diligence’, 
reinforcing the centrality of the concept in Ruggie’s scheme.
8
 Two other Guiding Principles 
(4 and 15) refer to due diligence, as does the Commentary to several other Guiding 
Principles.   
The use of the term ‘due diligence’ in the Guiding Principles appears to be a clever and 
deliberate tactic, as it is familiar to business people, human rights and states, among whom 
Ruggie sought to build a consensus on his approach.
9
 However, due diligence is normally 
understood to mean different things by human rights lawyers and by business people. This 
article argues that human rights lawyers understand ‘due diligence’ as a standard of conduct 
required to discharge an obligation,
10
 whereas business people normally understand ‘due 
diligence’ as a process to manage business risks. The Guiding Principles invoke both 
understandings of the term at different points, without acknowledging that there are two 
quite different concepts operating and without seeking to explain how the two concepts 
relate to one another in the context of business and human rights. 
In this article we advance three arguments. First, we show that the Guiding Principles invoke 
two very different understandings of due diligence without clarifying how they relate to 
each other. Second, we contend that the confusion arising from this conceptual slippage is 
problematic in practice, both because it creates uncertainty about the extent of businesses’ 
responsibility to respect human rights and because it creates uncertainty about how that 
responsibility relates to businesses’ correlative responsibility to provide a remedy in 
situations where they have infringed human rights. Third, we propose and justify an 
interpretation of the Guiding Principles that clarifies the relationship between the two 
concepts of due diligence. A key element of this proposal is the argument that due diligence, 
understood as a standard of conduct, is not a relevant concept in defining the extent of 
businesses’ responsibility for their own infringements of human rights, it is only relevant in 
defining the extent of businesses’ responsibility for infringements of human rights by third 
                                                          
7
 Framework, note 1, at para 56. 
8
 Guiding Principles 17-21.  
9
 Just Business, note 2, pages 141-148. 
10
 In his first use of the term in the Framework Report, note 1, at para 25, Ruggie defines due diligence as a 
standard of conduct, referring to the definition of due diligence in Black’s Law Dictionary: ‘[T]he diligence 
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parties.
11
 In order to advance these arguments, we begin by clarifying the two different 
concepts of due diligence and the way in which they relate to each other. 
B. Due Diligence as a Business Process 
In a business context, due diligence is normally understood to refer to a process of 
investigation conducted by a business to identify and manage commercial risks: 
[The] main purpose [of due diligence] is to confirm facts, data and 
representations involved in a commercial transaction in order to determine 
the value, price and risk of such transactions, including the risk of future 
litigation.
12
 
One example is in the area of mergers and acquisitions where ‘the purpose of due diligence 
is … to enable a purchaser to find out all he [/she] reasonably can about what it is he [/she] 
is buying to help him decide whether to proceed’.
13
 This might involve an analysis of assets, 
contracts, customers, employee agreements and benefits, environmental issues, facilities, 
plant and equipment, financial condition, foreign operations and activities, legal factors, 
product issues, supplier issues and tax issues.
14
 While due diligence processes often include 
legal risks within their scope, the risk of legal liability is simply another commercial 
consideration to be identified and managed in the context of a particular transaction. For 
example, in order to make an informed commercial decision about whether to proceed with 
an acquisition, the acquirer may investigate the potential for legal liability arising from past 
acts of corruption,
15
 or past environmental contamination,
16
 even if no legal claims against 
the target have proceeded to final judgment at the time of the transaction. 
                                                          
11
 For the purposes of this article, we accept Ruggie’s characterisation of businesses’ responsibility to respect 
human rights as a global norm grounded in ‘social expectations’, as opposed to a legal obligation under 
international law. Our aim is to clarify the extent and implications of this social norm, as articulated in the 
Framework and the Guiding Principles.  
12
 Olga Martin-Ortega, ‘Human rights due diligence for corporations: From voluntary standards to hard law at 
last?’ 31 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights (2013) 44 at 51. 
13
 Andrew Evans, ‘Due Diligence: the English Way’ (1995) 6 International Company and Commercial Law 
Review 195 at 195.  
14
 See Slaughter and May, Due Diligence and Disclosure in Private Acquisitions and Disposals (2007), 8-10; and 
Wilson Chu, ‘Avoiding surprises through due diligence’, 6 Bus. L. Today 8 1996-1997. 
15
 For example, the UK Bribery Act 2010 and UK Prevention of Crime Act 2002, and the US Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act 1977. For the latter, see the US Department of Justice’s Foreign Corrupt Practice Review ‘Opinion 
Procedure Release No. 008-02’ issued to Halliburton (13 June 2008).   
16
 For example, Part IIA of the UK Environmental Protection Act 1990. 
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Business due diligence processes are not specific to mergers and acquisitions, as the term is 
used to refer to any set of processes undertaken by a business to identify and manage risks 
to the business – for example the risks of partnering with a particular organisation, 
employing particular individuals, making a loan, or investing in a given sector.
17
 The scope 
and extent of a due diligence process will vary according to the nature and context of the 
transaction.
18
 In subsequent sections we will also see that instituting processes of due 
diligence is a legal requirement under some regulatory schemes. Nevertheless, the basic 
understanding of due diligence in a business context is ‘a procedural practice to assess risk 
in a company’s own interest’.
19
 
C. Due Diligence as a Standard of Conduct 
The concept of due diligence, understood as a standard of conduct required to discharge an 
obligation, can be traced to Roman law.
20
 Under Roman law a person was liable for 
accidental harm caused to others if the harm resulted from the person’s failure to meet the 
standard of conduct expected of a diligens (or bonus) paterfamilias – a phrase that 
translates roughly as a prudent head of a household.
21
 This was an objective standard, 
which allowed a defendant’s conduct to be assessed against an external standard of 
expected conduct, rather than in light of the defendant’s own intentions and motivations. It 
is also fact specific, in that what could be expected of a prudent person is dependent on the 
circumstances of the case.
22
 Elaborating in the sixth century AD, Justinian argued that an 
individual may be liable for harm where ‘what should have been foreseen by a diligent man 
was not foreseen’.
23
 
                                                          
17
 There is a considerable literature setting out the benefits of well-designed due diligence processes in 
facilitating good business decision-making: see, for example, Linda Spedding, The Due Diligence Handbook: 
Corporate Governance, Risk Management and Business Planning (Elsevier 2009); Jeffery Perry and Thomas 
Herd, ‘Reducing M&A risk through improved Due Diligence’ (2004) 32 Strategy & Leadership 12. 
18
 See Douglas Godfrey, ‘Transactional Skills Training: All About Due Diligence’ (2009) Transactions Tenn. J. Bus. 
L. 357 at 358. 
19
 Martin-Ortega, note 12, 51. 
20
 Reinhard Zimmerman, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (Oxford 
University Press 1996) 1009. 
21
 Charles Lobingier, The Evolution of the Roman Law: From Before the Twelve Tables to the Corpus Juris (2
nd
 
edn, Fred B Rothman & Co 1923) 105; cf Edward Arthur Whittuck, Institutes of Roman by Gaius: with a 
Translation and Commentary (tr Edward Poste, 4
th
 edn, Oxford University Press 1905) at 429. 
22
 Zimmerman, note 20, at 1008.  
23
 Justinian, The Digest of Roman Law: Theft, Rapine, Damage and Insult (tr Colin Kolbert, Penguin 1979) 91. 
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The standard of the diligens paterfamilias influenced the development of the tort of 
negligence in many legal systems.
24
 The tort of negligence has common elements across 
different legal systems – duty, breach, causation, and harm – although they are often 
classified differently.
25
 In determining whether a defendant has been negligent, the central 
question is whether the defendant has met a standard of expected conduct.
26
 The diligens 
paterfamilias standard was directly incorporated into Roman-Dutch tort law as the relevant 
standard of conduct.
27
 It also became the basis for the development of the ‘reasonable man’ 
test in the English law of negligence,
28
 and for similar standards in civil law legal systems.
29
 
As such, due diligence, understood as a standard of conduct, and negligence are closely 
related – ‘the opposite of negligence is diligence’.
30
 
The concept of due diligence seems to have passed into international law through the 
writings of Grotius in the 17 century.
31
 However, in contrast to its Roman law origins, in 
international law due diligence functions primarily as a standard of conduct that defines and 
circumscribes the responsibility of a state in relation to the conduct of third parties.
32
 In the 
SS Lotus Case
33
 before the Permanent Court of International Justice in 1927, Justice Moore 
observed that ‘[i]t is well settled that a State is bound to use due diligence to prevent the 
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 Cees Van Dam, ‘Tort Law and Human Rights: Brothers in Arms – On the Role of Tort Law in the Area of 
Business and Human Rights’ (2011) JETL 221 at 237.  
25
 Yousuf Aftab, ‘The Intersection of Law and Corporate Social Responsibility: Human Rights Strategy and 
Litigation Readiness for Extractive-Sector Companies,” 60 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 19-1 (2014) at 23.  
26
 Cees Van Dam, note 24, at 237. 
27
 Robert Lee, An Introduction to Roman-Dutch Law (4
th
 edn, Oxford University Press 1946) 324. 
28
 Richard Meeran, ‘Tort Litigation Against Multinationals (‘MNCs’) for Violation of Human Rights: An Overview 
of the Position Outside the US’ (2011) available at http://business-
humanrights.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/richard-meeran-tort-litigation-against-mncs-7-mar-
2011.pdf, at 8. See also Doug Cassel, ‘Outlining the Case for a Common Law Duty of Care of Business to 
Exercise Human Rights Due Diligence’ (2016) 1 Business and Human Rights Journal 179. 
29
 David Ibbetson, A Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligations (Oxford University Press 1999) at 168. 
30
 Whittuck, note 21, at 429. See, similarly, Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass, UK House of Lords, [1972] AC 
153, 199 per Lord Diplock. 
31
 Jan Arno Hessbruegge, ‘The Historical Development of the Doctrines of Attribution and Due Diligence in 
International Law’ (2004) 36 International Law and Politics 265. 
32
 Ibid, p. 268; See also Daria Davitti, ‘On the Meanings of International Investment Law and International 
Human Rights Law: the Alternative Narrative of Due Diligence’ (2012) 12 Human Rights Law Review 421, 445. 
33
 SS Lotus (France v Turkey) 1927 PCIJ (Ser. A) No 10. 
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commission within its dominions of criminal acts against another nation or its people’.
34
 
Conversely, the tribunal in the Wipperman case explained that no state is responsible for 
acts of private individuals in its territory ‘as long as reasonable diligence is used in 
attempting to prevent the occurrence or recurrence of such wrongs’.
35
  
In AAPL v Sri Lanka, the Tribunal recognised that this obligation extended to the protection 
of foreign-owned property. Consistently with the Roman law origins of the concept of due 
diligence, the Tribunal equated due diligence with a duty to take reasonable steps to avoid 
harm.
36
 The Tribunal contrasted this obligation of due diligence with:  
[An] absolute obligation which guarantees that no damages will be suffered, in the 
sense that any violation thereof creates automatically a ‘strict liability’ on behalf of 
the host State.
37
 
Similarly, in international environmental law, the basic position is that states are not strictly 
liable for transboundary environmental damage.
38
 Rather, states are required to exercise 
due diligence to prevent significant transboundary harm emanating from their territory.
39
 
The concept of due diligence plays an important role in international human rights law in 
defining the extent of a state’s obligations to prevent and respond to infringements of 
human rights by private actors within its territory or jurisdiction. The UN Human Rights 
Committee (HRC) has expressed these obligations on the state in this way: 
[T]he positive obligations on States Parties to ensure Covenant rights will only 
be fully discharged if individuals are protected by the State, not just against 
violations of Covenant rights by its agents, but also against acts committed by 
private persons or entities that would impair the enjoyment of Covenant 
rights in so far as they are amenable to application between private persons 
                                                          
34
 Ibid, Justice Moore, referencing the US Supreme Court case of United States v Arjona (1887) 120 US 479. 
35
 John Bassett Moore, History and Digest of the International Arbitrations to which the United States has been 
a Party, Washington 1898-1906, III, 2947) vol III, 3041 (emphasis added). 
36
 Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. v Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No ARB/87/3, Final Award, 27 June 1990, 
paras 75-77. 
37
 Ibid, at para 86.  
38
 Patricia Birnie, Alan Boyle and Catherine Redgwell, International Law and the Environment (Oxford 
University Press 2009) 217-218. 
39
 For example,  International Law Commission (ILC), ‘Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from 
Hazardous Activities, with commentaries‘ 53
rd
 session (2001) Doc. A/56/10, II Yearbook of the International 
Law Commission, art 3, at para 7. 
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or entities. There may be circumstances in which a failure to ensure Covenant 
rights … would give rise to violations by States Parties of those rights, as a 
result of States Parties’ permitting or failing to take appropriate measures or 
to exercise due diligence to prevent, punish, investigate or redress the harm 
caused by such acts by private persons or entities.
40
 
This is distinct from attribution of the conduct of private actors to the state.
41
 Insofar as the 
conduct of private actors is not attributable to the state, the state is under an obligation to 
satisfy a certain standard of conduct – that of due diligence – in preventing and responding 
to the conduct of third parties.
42
 These are ongoing obligations.
43
 The role of due diligence 
as a standard of conduct defining states’ obligations in relation to the infringement of 
human rights by third parties is uncontroversial, as shown by its recognition in Resolutions 
of the UN General Assembly,
44
 human rights courts,
45
 treaty monitoring bodies,
46
 and 
academic commentators.
47
 
                                                          
40
 HRC, General Comment 31: Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the 
Covenant, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (29 March 2004), para 8 (emphasis added). Interestingly, Guiding 
Principle 1 articulates the state’s responsibility to protect individuals’ human rights from abuse by third parties 
using the same four words – states must take ‘appropriate steps to prevent, investigate, punish and redress 
human rights abuse by third parties’ (our emphasis). 
41
 Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988, Inter-Am.Ct.H.R. (Ser. C) No. 4 (1988) at para 172. 
42
 Timo Koivurova, ‘Due Diligence’ (Feb 2010) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law at para 3: 
‘[a] breach of these obligations [to exercise due diligence] consists not of failing to achieve the desired result 
but failing to take the necessary, diligent steps towards that end.’ 
43
 See, for example, the European Court of Human Right’s judgment in Jordan v UK, Application No. 24746/94 
(2001), and the UN Committee Against Torture’s finding in Halimi-Nedzibi v Austria (8/1991), 1(2) IHRR 190 at 
para 13.5 (1994). 
44
 Article 4(c) of the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women adopted by the General 
Assembly in 1993 requires states to ‘exercise due diligence to prevent, investigate and, in accordance with 
national legislation, punish acts of violence against women.’ UN General Assembly Resolution 48/104, (20 
December 1993), UN Doc A/RES/48/104. 
45
 See Velasquez Rodriguez Case, note 41, para 172. See also, Ergi v. Turkey (App. 23818/94) (1998) 32 EHRR 
388; Timurtas v. Turkey (App no 23531/94) (2000) ECHR 13 June 2000; and Bevacqua and S v Bulgaria (App no 
71127/01) ECtHR 12 June 2008. See further Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors 
(Oxford University Press, 2006). 
46
 See Commission Nationale des Droits de l'Homme et des Libertes v. Chad, African Commission on Human and 
Peoples' Rights, (1995) Communication No. 74/92. 
47
 For example, Riccardo Pisillo-Mazzeschi, Responsabilité de d’état pour violations des obligations positives 
relatives aux droits de l’homme, (2008) 333 Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law 
2008, Chapter IV. 
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In contrast, if the conduct of private actors is attributable to the state, the state is liable as if 
that conduct were the conduct of the state itself. When a state itself interferes with an 
individual’s human rights, the question of whether the state has breached its obligations 
under international human rights law does not turn on whether the state has acted with 
insufficient diligence.
48
 Factors such as whether the interference is proportionate or 
necessary to protect a legitimate public interest may be relevant in determining whether 
the interference is, nevertheless, consistent with the state’s obligations under international 
human rights law. But the concept of due diligence is not normally relevant.
49
 
In summary, in international law ‘due diligence is concerned with supplying a standard of 
care against which fault can be assessed’ that is relevant in some circumstances but not in 
others.
50
 As a standard of conduct, it defines the extent of states’ responsibility, for 
example, for infringements of human rights, damage to foreign property and transboundary 
pollution.
51
 It imposes an external, ‘objective’ standard of conduct to take reasonable 
precaution to prevent, or to respond to, certain types of harm specified by the rule in 
question.
52
 What this standard of conduct requires in a given situation is dependent on the 
particular facts of the case, and may change over time.
53
 Relevant factors in determining 
whether a state’s conduct in a particular fact scenario has met the standard of due diligence 
                                                          
48
 Steven Ratner, ‘Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility’ (2001) 111 Yale Law 
Journal 443 at 523. 
49
 Timo Koivurova, note 42, at paras 2 and 7; Björn Fasterling and Geert Demuijnck ‘Human Rights in the Void? 
Due Diligence in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’ (2013) 116 Journal for Business 
Ethics 799-814. 
50
 International Law Association (ILA), Study Group on Due Diligence in International Law, Second Report, July 
2016 available at http://www.ila-hq.org/en/study-groups/index.cfm/cid/1045. 
51
 See, for example, Joanna Bourke-Martignoni, ‘The History and Development of the Due Diligence Standard 
in International Law and its Role in the Protection of Women Against Violence’ in Carin Benninger-Brudel (ed) 
Due Diligence and its Application to Protect Women from Violence (Martinus Nijoff, 2008) at 49;  Hessbruegge, 
note 31; International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea Advisory Opinion, Case No. 17: Responsibilities and 
Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area (1 February 2011), 
available at 
 http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_17/adv_op_010211.pdf at paras 72 and 110; 
and Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay), [2010] ICJ Rep 14, at para 101. 
52
 See Xue Hanquin, Transboundary Damage in International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2003) 162-165. 
See, contra, Virginie Barral, ‘Sustainable Development in International Law: Nature and Operation of an 
Evolutive Legal Norm’ (2012) 23 European Journal of International Law 377, who argues, at 391, that ‘due 
diligence’ obligations in international law are obligations ‘to employ best efforts’.  
53
 See Seabed Mining Advisory Opinion, ITLOS (2011) 50 ILM 458, para 117. 
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include the degree of the risk of harm,
54
 and the resources, both economic and 
technological, available to the state.
55
 For the purposes of this article, one important 
conclusion is that, in the context of international human rights law, the concept of due 
diligence is primarily relevant in defining the extent of states’ obligations in relation to the 
conduct of private actors that is not attributable to the state.  
D. Regulatory Schemes: Relationships between the Two Concepts of Due Diligence 
Some regulatory schemes link due diligence, understood as a standard of expected conduct, 
with prescribed processes of investigation. For example, section 11 of the US Federal 
Securities Act 1933 makes the directors of a corporation issuing securities liable for 
incorrect statements and omissions of material facts in the documentation accompanying a 
securities offering.
56
 The Act also recognises a ‘due diligence’ defence to liability.
57
 To 
benefit from this defence, directors must satisfy two requirements. First, the defendant 
must show that they carried out a process of ‘reasonable investigation’ in an attempt to 
establish that the statements were true and complete. The requirement to conduct an 
investigative process is akin to the way that the ‘due diligence’ is normally understood in 
business practice. Second, the defendant must have reasonably believed that the 
statements were true and complete.
58
 The second requirement means that the defendant’s 
liability is determined in light of an objective standard of prudent conduct – specifically, 
whether there were reasonable grounds to believe that the statements were true.
59
 
                                                          
54
 See International Law Commission ‘Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous 
Activities, with commentaries’ op cit, Vol II Part Two at 154 para 11, and Case Presented on the Part of the 
Government of Her Britannic Majesty in Papers relating to Foreign Relations of the United States 1872 (United 
States Government Printing Office Washington 1872) part 2 vol I, 412. 
55
 See Timo Koivurova, note 42, at para 19. 
56
 See Mark Taylor, Luc Zandvliet and Mitra Forouhar ‘Due Diligence for Human Rights: A Risk-Based Approach’ 
(2010) Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative Working Paper No. 53 (Cambridge, John F. Kennedy School of 
Government, Harvard University) 2. 
57
 See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382 (1983); William Sjostrom, ‘The Due Diligence 
Defense under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933’ (2005) 44 Brandeis Law Journal 549. 
58
 See Sjostrom, ibid, 574. 
59
 Similarly, Taylor, Zandvliet, Forouhar, note 56, p. 3: ‘The due diligence process fuses two conceptually 
distinct processes; one is an investigation of facts, and the other is an evaluation of the facts in light of the 
relevant standard of care.’ 
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Several other regulatory schemes – including those concerned with corruption
60
 and 
consumer safety
61
 – combine the two concepts of due diligence in various ways.  A common 
feature of such regimes is that they are focused on the prevention of certain types of harm 
to stakeholders outside the business. They do this by establishing a basic principle that 
businesses are liable for certain forms of harm and then encouraging or requiring businesses 
to implement and maintain internal processes of investigation and control to avoid the 
harm.
62
 The focus of such regulatory schemes contrasts to businesses’ voluntary use of due 
diligence processes, where the focus is normally on the identification and management of 
commercial risks to the business itself. 
In international law, courts are also recognising the distinction, and trying to clarify the 
relationship, between the two concepts of due diligence in particular contexts. In both the 
Pulp Mills and Costa Rica v Nicaragua cases,
63
 the ICJ considered due diligence in context of 
transboundary harm. Jutta Brunnée argues that ‘the ICJ distinguishes between a duty to 
take diligent steps to prevent significant transboundary harm, which it then deals with 
under the rubric of separate procedural obligations, and the duty to take diligent steps not 
to cause harm’.
64
 The former is an obligation on the state to implement and maintain 
internal processes of investigation and control. The latter is a restatement of the principle 
that states are liable for transboundary environmental harm if the harm results from a 
failure to act diligently, understood as a standard of conduct. In the absence of harm, there 
is no breach of the latter obligation. 
Although some regulatory schemes integrate both concepts of due diligence, the two do not 
necessarily go hand in hand. For example, the UK Modern Slavery Act 2015 requires 
companies to publish an annual statement documenting the steps they are taking to 
                                                          
60
 Section 7(1) of the UK Bribery Act 2010 creates an offence where a company fails to prevent bribery 
committed by a person associated with the company. Section 7(2) provides for a defence where the company 
can prove that it had ‘adequate procedures’ in place to prevent such bribery. ‘Due diligence’ is recognised as 
an ‘adequate procedure’: UK Ministry of Justice, Guidance on the Bribery Act 2010, at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/181762/bribery-act-2010-
guidance.pdf at 20-31.   
61
 The UK Food Safety Act creates a range of offences relating to the preparation and supply of food that is 
‘injurious to health’. It is a defence for the person charged to prove that they took all reasonable precautions 
and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of the offence by himself or by a person under his 
control UK Food Safety Act 1990, Section 21, and Regulation of the Food Hygiene (England) Regulations 2006. 
62
 Taylor, Zandvliet and Forouhar, note 56, 2. See also judicial discussion in London Borough of Croydon v Pinch 
A Pound UK Ltd [2010] EWHC 3283 (Admin) at para 19. 
63
 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay), [2010] ICJ Rep 14, at para 101; and Costa Rica v 
Nicaragua/Nicaragua v Costa Rica, ICJ Judgment, 16 December 2015. 
64
 Jutta Brunnée, ‘Procedure and Substance in International Environmental Law: Confused at a Higher Level 
(2016) 5 ESIL Reflections 6 (3 June, 2016). 
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eradicate slavery and human trafficking in their own operations and in their supply chains.
65
 
One of the purposes of the Act is to encourage companies to institute due diligence 
processes in relation to slavery and human trafficking,
66
 and the Act specifies that the 
statement may include information about such processes.
67
 However, the Act does not 
make a business legally liable for slavery and human trafficking within its supply chain and 
the concept of due diligence, understood as a standard of conduct, plays no role in the 
scheme established by the Act.
68
  
Another example is the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requirement for 
publicly traded companies to report on the origin of certain minerals obtained from 
Democratic Republic of Congo. Instituting a process of due diligence to establish the origin 
of such minerals is mandatory in certain circumstances,
69
 and SEC Regulations are highly 
prescriptive as to the form that the process of due diligence must take.
70
 However, the Act 
does not make a company legally liable for using such minerals and due diligence, 
understood as a standard of conduct, plays on role. Such schemes impose reporting 
requirements on businesses with the objective of changing business practices, but they do 
not seek to provide remediation for victims.
71
 These examples highlight the importance of 
understanding the relationship (if any) between the two concepts of due diligence in any 
given regulatory scheme. 
E. Meanings of Due Diligence in the Guiding Principles  
The term ‘due diligence’ is not used consistently in the Guiding Principles. Guiding Principles 
17 to 21, which appear under the heading ‘human rights due diligence’, describe a range of 
                                                          
65
 Section 54 of the UK Modern Slavery Act 2015. It applies to all companies supplying goods or services with 
an annual turnover of £36 million and which carry on business, or a part of their business, in the UK: Section 
54(2)(b) read with Regulation 2 of the Modern Slavery Act (Transparency in Supply Chains) Regulations 2015. 
66
 See ‘Transparency in Supply Chains,: a Practical Guide’ (2015) 
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69
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processes and procedures that business should have in place to identify, avoid and monitor 
their human rights impacts. All of these procedures fit squarely within the understanding of 
due diligence as a set of business processes. Indeed, Guiding Principle 17 is explicit that due 
diligence refers to a “process” of investigation and control implemented by a business 
enterprise.
72
 This emphasis on due diligence processes is consistent with the Framework’s 
explanation of how business enterprises should ensure that they respect human rights: 
What is required is due diligence - a process whereby companies not only ensure 
compliance with national laws but also manage the risk of human rights harm 
with a view to avoiding it.
73
 
This concept of due diligence is also reflected in Guiding Principle 15:  
In order to meet their responsibility to respect human rights, business 
enterprises should have in place policies and processes… including… (b) A human 
rights due diligence process to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how 
they address their impacts on human rights.  
In contrast, in a 2009 report to the Human Rights Council during the development of the 
Guiding Principles, Ruggie defines due diligence as the ‘diligence reasonably expected from, 
and ordinarily exercised by, a person who seeks to satisfy a legal requirement or to 
discharge an obligation’.
74
 Taken in isolation, this definition clearly refers to a due diligence 
as a standard of conduct. However, the 2009 report then continues:  
[t]he Special Representative uses this term [due diligence] in its broader sense: a 
comprehensive, proactive attempt to uncover human rights risks, actual and 
                                                          
72
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potential, over the entire life cycle of a project or business activity, with the aim of 
avoiding and mitigating those risks.
75
  
This passage is unclear, but it appears to mix the two concepts of due diligence, suggesting 
that Ruggie may have had regulatory schemes that integrate both concepts in mind.
76
 
Ruggie’s final report to the Human Rights Council, which contains the Guiding Principles 
themselves accompanied by a brief introduction, suggests that due diligence is a standard of 
conduct businesses must meet to discharge their responsibility to respect human rights. The 
introduction explains that business enterprises’ basic responsibility is to respect human 
rights, meaning that they ‘should act with due diligence to avoid infringing the rights of 
others’.
77
 However, the ‘foundational’ Guiding Principles that elaborate the meaning and 
scope of the corporate responsibility to respect human rights – namely, Guiding Principles 
11, 12 and 13 – do not refer to due diligence at all. On the contrary, Guiding Principle 11 
simply states that businesses’ responsibility to respect human rights ‘means that they 
should avoid infringing on the human rights of others and should address adverse human 
rights impacts with which they are involved’.  
This formulation conspicuously avoids specifying a standard of conduct, suggesting that 
businesses breach their basic responsibility to respect human rights whenever they infringe 
human rights, triggering a correlative responsibility to provide a remedy. 
F. Consequences of Confusion 
This conceptual slippage is not necessarily problematic. Scholarship in the fields of 
international law and political science suggests that constructive ambiguity can be a useful 
tool in building consensus on contested issues.
78
 However, in the context of the Guiding 
Principles, confusion about the meaning of due diligence in the Guiding Principles causes 
two significant problems in practice. This section outlines these problems. Moreover, this 
confusion does not appear to be the result of intentional use of constructive ambiguity on 
Ruggie’s part, a point to which we return in the following section.
79
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The first problem is that confusion around the meaning of due diligence encourages the 
incorrect view that implementing due diligence processes is sufficient to discharge 
businesses’ responsibility to respect human rights. An early guide on human rights due 
diligence process produced by the global oil and gas industry association for environmental 
and social issues illustrates this concern.
80
 It asserts that ‘[a] human rights due diligence 
process is not a legal requirement, but rather a good industry practice to manage potential 
issues and impacts associated with business operations.’
81
 Although the document purports 
to be based on the Guiding Principles, it says almost nothing about the foundational 
responsibility of business to respect human rights and nothing at all about businesses’ 
correlative responsibility to provide a remedy for their adverse human rights impacts. A 
recent analysis of thirty large companies’ statements suggests that business and human 
rights indicates that this is not an isolated phenomenon.
82
 Other commentators have 
expressed concerns that an exclusive focus on due diligence processes that are not 
tethered to the foundational responsibility to respect human rights may encourage ‘tick-
box’ exercises allow businesses to claim that they are compliant with the Guiding 
Principles.
83
 This undermines Ruggie’s objective to establish ‘an authoritative focal point 
around which the expectations and actions of relevant stakeholders could converge’
84
 and 
could also discourage the evolution of legal and regulatory measures at the national level 
that encourage or require businesses to respect human rights.
85
  
Of course, Ruggie’s emphasis on due diligence processes was a component of a deliberate 
strategy to shift the focus of debate business and human rights to the active steps 
                                                          
80
 IPIECA ‘Human rights due diligence process: A practical guide to implementation for oil and gas companies’, 
2012, available at http://www.ipieca.org/publication/human-rights-due-diligence-process-practical-guide-
implementation-oil-and-gas-companies.    
81
 Ibid, at 2. 
82
 Ken McPhail and Carol Adams, ‘Corporate Respect for Human Rights: Meaning, Scope, and the Shifting Order 
of Discourse’ (2016) 29 Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 650. 
83
 See Fasterling and Demuijnck, note 49, at 805-806; and Ana Nacvalovaite, Alex Zapesochny and Margaret 
Jones ‘Integrating Concern for Human Rights into the Mergers & Acquisitions Due Diligence Process’ Good 
Practice Note to the UN Global Compact Human Rights Working Group (26 July 2013), available at 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/issues_doc/human_rights/Human_Rights_Working_Group/MandA_G
PN.pdf, at 9.   
84
 Report UN Doc A/HRC/17/31 (2011), note 4, at para 5. 
85
 On the complementary role of such measures, see Mark Taylor, ‘Due Diligence: A Compliance Standard for 
Responsible European Companies’ (2014) European Company Law 86, 89. 
15 
 
businesses should take to prevent adverse human rights impacts.
86
 He sought to build the 
case that businesses already implement similar processes to prevent other types of harm,
87
 
and that businesses themselves could benefit from adopting a more proactive approach to 
preventing adverse human rights impacts.
88
 Both arguments are important in driving 
practical change within the business community. However, the Framework and the Guiding 
Principles were expressly intended to function as ‘an inter-related and dynamic system of 
preventative and remedial measures’,
89
 not only a series of recommendations about 
improvements of business processes. 
Second, and more importantly for our purposes, failure to distinguish between the two 
different meanings of due diligence creates confusion about the situations in which 
businesses that infringe human rights can be said to have breached their responsibility to 
respect human rights and, therefore, to have a responsibility to provide a remedy within the 
scheme established by the Guiding Principles. This confusion concerns the standard of 
conduct, if any, that defines the extent of businesses’ responsibility to respect human rights.  
If due diligence, understood as a standard of conduct, applies, then a business is only 
responsible for adverse human rights impacts that result from its failure to act with 
reasonable diligence. On this interpretation, a business enterprise does not breach its 
responsibility to respect human rights if it has acted diligently in its attempt to avoid causing 
adverse human rights impacts but, due to unfortunate or unforeseen events, has caused 
serious adverse human rights impacts. In contrast, if businesses breach their responsibility 
to respect human rights whenever they infringe human rights – i.e. if the responsibility to 
respect human rights is akin to a strict liability standard and does not entail a fault element 
– then a business’s responsibility to redress situations in which it has infringed human rights 
is independent of any debate about whether the business acted with sufficient diligence or 
care. On this interpretation, a business enterprise is responsible for all its adverse human 
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rights impacts regardless of whether those impacts were unexpected or costly to prevent. 
This distinction has significant practical implications both for businesses seeking to comply 
with their responsibilities, and for individuals and communities whose human rights are 
affected by business activity. 
G. Clarifying Due Diligence in the Guiding Principles 
In our view, the Guiding Principles are best understood as imposing different responsibilities 
for a business enterprise’s own adverse human rights impacts, and for the human rights 
impacts caused by third parties with which the business enterprise has relationships. 
Businesses have a strict – or no fault – responsibility for their own adverse human rights 
impacts. This means that businesses have a responsibility to provide a remedy whenever 
they infringe human rights; due diligence, understood as a standard conduct, is not relevant. 
However, due diligence, as standard of conduct, is relevant in defining the extent to which 
businesses are responsible for the adverse human rights of third parties. Due diligence 
processes are the means by which businesses should ensure that it discharge these 
responsibilities. This interpretation, we believe, clarifies how the two concepts of due 
diligence relate to each other within the scheme established by the Framework and Guiding 
Principles, and solves the two problems identified in the previous section. In addition, our 
interpretation: is the most internally coherent reading of the Framework and the Guiding 
Principle; is consistent with international human rights law; and is justified on other policy 
grounds. We address each of these three arguments in turn. 
a. Coherence between the Framework and the Guiding Principles 
The Guiding Principles establish that business enterprises have a responsibility not to 
infringe human rights by their own actions and a responsibility to exercise influence - 
‘leverage’ in the lexicon of the Guiding Principles - over certain third parties to prevent them 
from infringing human rights.
90
 This distinction is made explicitly in Guiding Principle 13, one 
of the foundational principles defining business enterprises’ responsibilities. It provides that 
business enterprises have a responsibility to: 
 (a) Avoid causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts through their 
own activities, and address such impacts when they occur; 
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(b) Seek to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts that are directly 
linked to their operations, products or services by their business relationships, 
even if they have not contributed to those impacts. 
Crucially, Guiding Principle 13 also suggests that different standards apply in relation to a 
business enterprise’s responsibility for its own adverse human rights impacts and its 
responsibility for third party impacts. A business enterprise should ‘avoid’ its own impacts, 
while the lesser standard of ‘seek to prevent’ applies in relation to third party impacts. This 
distinction makes sense – it would be illogical and impractical for a business to be held 
responsible for the conduct of every one of its ‘business partners, entities in its value chain, 
and any other non-State or State entity directly linked to its business operations, products 
or services’
91
 to the same standard as it is held responsible for its own conduct.
92
  
This distinction supports our argument that different standards of conduct apply in relation 
to businesses’ responsibility for their own adverse human rights impacts and their 
responsibility for the human rights impacts caused by third parties.
93
 However, beyond the 
distinction between the terms ‘avoid’ and ‘seek to prevent’, the Guiding Principles do not 
further define the relevant standards. The challenge is to clarify the relevant standards of 
conduct that apply in relation to each element of the responsibility. 
In relation to a business’s own conduct, the Guiding Principles ‘operationalise’ the 2008 
Framework.
94
 The Framework explains that businesses’ responsibility to respect human 
rights ‘means not to infringe on the rights of others - put simply, to do no harm.'
95
 This ‘do 
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no harm’ formulation implies that a business breaches its responsibility to respect human 
rights whenever it infringes it human rights. It does not limit a business enterprise’s 
responsibility only to infringements of human rights that arise from a failure to act diligently 
or to those infringements accompanied by some other fault element. 
The view that business enterprises have a strict – or no fault – responsibility for their own 
adverse human rights impacts is also consistent with Guiding Principle 22, which states that: 
Where business enterprises identify that they have caused or contributed to 
adverse impacts, they should provide for or cooperate in their remediation 
through legitimate processes.
96
  
This formulation makes clear that a business’s responsibility to remedy its own adverse 
human rights impacts is not contingent on whether the infringement resulted from its failure 
to act diligently, or on any other fault element. That businesses breach their responsibility to 
respect human rights whenever they infringe human rights by their own conduct was 
subsequently made explicit in the Interpretive Guide to the Guiding Principles published in 
2012.
97
  
Our interpretation also finds support in the Commentary to Guiding Principle 17, which 
cautions that: 
Conducting appropriate human rights due diligence should help business 
enterprises address the risk of legal claims against them by showing that 
they took every reasonable step to avoid involvement with an alleged 
human rights abuse. However, business enterprises conducting such due 
diligence should not assume that, by itself, this will automatically and fully 
absolve them from liability for causing or contributing to human rights 
abuses.
98
 
Although this passage refers to the relationship between due diligence processes and  legal 
obligations that exist independently of the scheme established by the Guiding Principles, it 
indicates that taking all reasonable steps – i.e. satisfying a due diligence standard of conduct 
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– is not, and should not be, sufficient to absolve businesses from accountability for their 
own adverse human rights impacts.
99
  
In contrast, the Guiding Principles impose a different standard of responsibility insofar as 
they concern the adverse human rights impacts of third parties.
100
 In our view, acting with 
due diligence to prevent and mitigate the adverse human rights impacts of entities with 
which it has business relationships is sufficient for a business to discharge this responsibility. 
This is for several reasons. First, as noted above, Guiding Principle 13 states that a business 
enterprise should ‘seek to prevent’ adverse human rights impacts of entities with which it 
has business relationships. This qualification clearly introduces a fault element in relation to 
third party impacts.  
Second, the Framework repeatedly draws attention to the difference between a business’s 
responsibility for its own adverse human rights impacts and its responsibility for the impacts 
of third parties.
101
 By positioning due diligence as an alternative to legal doctrines of 
‘complicity’ and ‘sphere of influence’ – both of which attempt to define the scope of a 
business’s responsibility for the actions of third parties, but which were rejected as ‘greater 
rigor is necessary … to provide companies with sufficient guidance in identifying specific 
actions they need to take’
102
 – the Report implies that due diligence is the standard of 
conduct that qualifies a business’s responsibility for third party impacts.
103
  
                                                          
99
 For example, in the 2010 Report to the Human Rights Council, ‘Business and human rights: further steps 
toward the operationalization of the “protect, respect and remedy”’ framework (9 April 2010) UN Doc 
A/HRC/14/27, it is stated at para 86: ‘the Special Representative would not support proposals that conducting 
human rights due diligence, by itself, should automatically and fully absolve a company Alien Tort Statute or 
similar liability.’ 
100
 Similarly, Radu Mares ‘Responsibility to Respect: Why the Core Company Should Act When Affiliates 
Infringe Human Rights’ in Radu Mares (ed) Siege or Cavalry Charge? The UN mandate on business and human 
rights (2012 Brill/Martinus Nijhoff) at 9, argues that ‘a core company’s responsibility to act [to prevent human 
rights infringement by a related entity] does not result naturally from a broad responsibility to respect, that is 
“to do no harm”; it is additional to that and needs to be justified separately.’ 
101
 See 'Clarifying the Concepts of “Sphere of Influence” and “Complicity”’ (15 May 2008) UN Doc No. 
A/HRC/8/16, at para 12: ‘[The sphere of influence metaphor] conflates two very different meanings of 
“influence”. One is “impact”, where the company’s activities or relationships are causing human rights harm. 
The other is whatever “leverage” a company may have over actors that are causing harm or could prevent 
harm. Impact falls squarely within the responsibility to respect; leverage may only do so in particular 
circumstances’. 
102
 Ibid, at para 6. See also Radu Mares, ‘A Gap in the Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights’ 
(2010) 36 Monash U. L. Rev. 33. 
103
 Ibid, at paras 6 and 71-72. 
20 
 
Third, the Guiding Principles use the concept of ‘leverage’ to define the extent of a business 
enterprise’s responsibility for the adverse human rights impacts of third parties. Leverage is 
understood as a business’s ability to exercise influence other the third party in practice.
104
 
According to the Commentary on the Guiding Principles, the exercise of ‘leverage’ requires a 
contextual judgment of what is reasonable in the circumstances. Relevant factors include 
how crucial the relationship is to the enterprise, the severity of the abuse, whether 
terminating the relationship in itself would have adverse human rights impacts, and 
whether capacity-building or other incentives may increase leverage.
105
 Contextual 
judgments of this type are the essence of due diligence as a standard of conduct, as seen 
above. Subsequent paragraphs of the Commentary to Guiding Principle 19 acknowledge 
that, if a business enterprise has taken reasonable steps to acquire and exercise leverage, it 
will not necessarily be responsible for the third party’s adverse human rights impacts.
106
 
This, too, is consistent with a due diligence standard of conduct. 
b. Consistency with International Human Rights Law 
As previously noted, both the Framework and the Guiding Principles describe business 
enterprises' foundational responsibility as a responsibility to respect human rights. In 
distinguishing businesses’ responsibility to respect human rights from states’ duty to protect 
human rights, the Guiding Principles adopts a taxonomy originally developed by Henry Shue, 
who proposed that the existence of human rights entails correlative duties to respect, 
protect and fulfil those rights.
107
 His taxonomy of duties has had a profound impact on 
international human rights law, including through adoption by the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR).
108
 The obligation to respect a human right is an obligation 
'to avoid measures that hinder or prevent the enjoyment of the right'.
109
 The obligation to 
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protect human rights is an obligation to prevent third parties from interfering with 
individuals' ability to exercise that right.
110
 In international human rights law, the concept of 
due diligence is not relevant in defining the extent of states’ obligations to respect human 
rights. States’ obligations to respect human rights are not generally qualified by any fault 
element, whereas states’ obligations to protect human rights from interference by third 
parties involve a due diligence standard of conduct.
111
  
In subsequent writing, Ruggie explains that he consciously modelled the corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights on states’ obligation to respect to human rights in 
international human rights law.
112
  However, it is clear that this corporate responsibility 
combines two different elements of Shue's taxonomy. Guiding Principle 13(a) concerns a 
business enterprise’s responsibility for its own impacts – it is a true responsibility to respect 
in the sense in which that term is understood by international human rights law. On the 
other hand, Guiding Principle 13(b) concerns a business enterprise’s responsibility to 
influence the conduct of third parties – a responsibility to protect human rights in the sense 
in which that term is understood in human rights discourse, albeit a circumscribed one.
113
  
One attractive feature of our interpretation of the Guiding Principles is consistency with 
international human rights law. As is the case with states’ obligation in international human 
rights law, we argue that businesses have a strict – or no fault – responsibility with their 
own adverse human rights impacts and that due diligence, understood as a standard of 
conduct, defines the extent of businesses’ responsibilities for the adverse human rights 
impacts of third parties. In our view, the justifications for this distinction in international 
human rights law are equally relevant in defining businesses’ responsibilities for adverse 
human rights impacts.
114
 Both states and businesses are complex institutions. Notions of 
fault, which reflect ideas about the moral culpability of natural persons, are less relevant to 
harm caused by states and corporate actors.
115
 As is the case with states, a scheme based 
on the principle that a business is strictly responsible for its own infringements of human 
rights creates stronger incentives for the business to establish systems of internal control – 
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such as due diligence processes – to prevent such impacts.116 Moreover, in subsequent 
writing Ruggie appears to confirm that businesses have a strict responsibility for their own 
adverse human rights impacts.
117
  
To be clear, we are not arguing that businesses’ responsibilities under the Guiding Principles 
are legally binding,
118
 or that they are equivalent in scope to states’ obligations under 
international human rights law. For instance, states have obligations to fulfil human rights. 
Businesses have no equivalent responsibilities within the scheme established by the Guiding 
Principles. Moreover, states’ obligations to protect individuals’ human rights require 
‘appropriate steps to prevent, investigate, punish and redress’ all infringements of human 
rights within their territory.
119
 The scope of a business’s responsibility in relation to third 
parties is limited to the prevention and mitigation of the adverse human rights impacts of 
those entities with which the business has ‘business relationships’. Our argument relates to 
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the specific issue of the standards of conduct that attach to different types of human rights 
obligations and responsibilities. 
c. Justified on policy grounds 
There are additional policy justifications for understanding a business enterprise’s 
responsibility for its own human rights impacts as a strict responsibility. One of Ruggie’s 
central concerns was to provide a framework that discouraged strategic ‘gaming’ by 
business enterprises and states.
120
 A strict responsibility for a business enterprise’s own 
adverse human rights impacts establishes a clear line of accountability to victims under 
Guiding Principle 22. In contrast, if a business enterprise were only responsible for those 
adverse human rights impacts that flow from a failure to act diligently, there would be much 
greater room for dispute about whether the responsibility had been breached.  
This would be undesirable for two reasons. First, the Guiding Principles rely to a significant 
extent on self-regulation by business enterprises, including through their own non-judicial 
grievance mechanisms, and in industry standards. So it would be easy for a business to 
assert that its adverse human rights were the result of unforeseeable events, rather than a 
failure to act diligently. Second, the evidence needed to determine whether a business 
enterprise acted diligently is likely to be in the possession of the business itself.
121
 To give a 
concrete example, in a case like the Bhopal disaster in India, it would be inappropriate to 
require victims to show that the chemical leak was a result of insufficient diligence in the 
maintenance of the facility’s safety systems in order to establish that Union Carbide had 
breached its responsibility to respect human rights.
122
 For both reasons, individuals whose 
human rights have been infringed by a business enterprise should not have to establish that 
such infringement resulted from a lack of diligence on the part of the business enterprise in 
order to be entitled to a remedy.  
A further implication of the interpretation we propose is that implementation of the due 
diligence processes required by the Guiding Principles is not sufficient to discharge the 
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responsibility to respect human rights.
123
 This does not diminish the importance of due 
diligence processes as the means by which businesses should discharge their responsibilities 
to respect human rights. Rather, our interpretation can improve the design of due diligence 
processes by clarifying the foundational responsibilities that due diligence processes should 
be directed towards discharging. For example, seeing due diligence processes as the means 
by which businesses should discharge foundational responsibilities to respect human rights 
provides clear justification for the observation in the Guiding Principles that due diligence 
processes should go ‘beyond simply identifying and managing material risks to the company 
itself, to include risks to rights-holders.’
124
 Our interpretation also seems consistent with the 
developments in other international instruments dealing with business and human rights. 125  
H. Conclusions 
One of the achievements of the Guiding Principles was to shift the focus of debate about 
business and human rights away from controversies about ex post liability for corporate 
violations and toward encouraging the adoption of processes required to prevent adverse 
human rights impacts.
126
 For this reason, the Guiding Principles emphasise the role of due 
diligence processes as the means by which businesses should discharge their 
responsibilities. However, we have argued that the Guiding Principles also invoke a different 
concept of due diligence – that of a standard of conduct required to discharge an obligation. 
Business people are generally more familiar with the former concept, whereas human rights 
lawyers are more familiar with the latter. In the first sections of this article we clarify these 
two different concepts of due diligence – and the relationship between them – and argue 
that the Guiding Principles use the two concepts in a way that is contradictory and unclear. 
                                                          
123
 Similarly, Fasterling and Demuijnck, note 49, 805-806, argue that due diligence processes are not a ‘proxy 
for [businesses] meeting their responsibilities’. 
124
 Commentary to Guiding Principle 17. 
125
 See Katarzyna Kryczka, Sarah Beckers and Tineka Lamboody, ‘The Importance of Due Diligence Practices for 
the Future of Business Operations in Fragile States’ (2012) European Company Law 125, who note that the 
OECD Guidelines (note 6), were amended after the publication of Framework with Chapter IV on Human Rights 
provisions added to include: a risk-based due diligence recommendation to identify, prevent and mitigate 
actual and potential adverse impacts and account for how these impacts are addressed;  a results-based 
recommendation to avoid causing or contributing to adverse impacts through one’s own activities and address 
such impacts when they occur; and  an effort-based recommendation to seek ways to prevent and mitigate 
adverse impacts to which the company is directly linked. 
126
 See Penelope Simons and Audrey Macklin ‘The Governance Gap: Extractive Industries, Human Rights, and 
the Home State Advantage’ (Routledge, 2014) at 315, who note that a governance gap still remains. 
25 
 
On this basis, we have offered a way to interpret the Guiding Principles coherently. In our 
view, a business enterprise’s responsibility to respect human rights is best understood as 
comprising two elements: its responsibility for its own adverse human rights impacts; and its 
responsibility for the human rights impacts of third parties with which it has business 
relationships. The former is a strict – or no fault – responsibility; the latter responsibility 
requires that the business satisfy a due diligence standard of conduct. In line with this 
distinction, a business enterprise has a correlative responsibility to provide a remedy for all 
its adverse human rights impacts, not only those adverse human rights impacts that result 
from a failure to act diligently. In contrast, a business enterprise is only required to take 
reasonable steps to prevent and mitigate the adverse human rights impacts of third parties. 
Due diligence processes are the means by which business enterprises should ensure they 
discharge their responsibility to respect human rights – both as it relates to their own 
adverse human rights impacts and as it relates to third party impacts.  
In additional to resolving fundamental conceptual confusion within the Guiding Principles, 
this interpretation is practically relevant for several reasons. First, business enterprises 
seeking to implement the Guiding Principles need clarity about the standard of conduct that 
they are expected to meet in avoiding adverse human rights impacts. Second, victims of 
corporate human rights abuse and NGOs advocating on their behalf need clarity as to 
whether the remedial responsibilities recognised by the Guiding Principles apply only in 
cases in which human rights infringements are the result of lack of diligence by a business 
enterprise. Third, it is relevant to the future of the Guiding Principles as a basis for national 
and international regulations and voluntary codes of conduct. The corporate responsibility 
to respect human rights could not be implemented in law, nor remedies made available, 
without clarification of the standard of conduct required to discharge that responsibility. 
 
 
